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AN ORDINARY UNDERSTANDING OF HUMAN 
BEINGS
Abstract: In this article I elucidate the term ‘human being’ by specifying 
concepts associated to it with intention of  emphasizing the primacy of  
one concept in particular. This is Wittgenstein’s concept of  an ordinary 
human being as it is used in the Philosophical Investigations (2009). It is ar-
gued that this notion is logically primitive, that is to say, a basic element 
in our conceptual repertoire that can serve us as a preliminary source 
for analyzing diverse aspects of  this individual. The idea is to outline 
here a conceptual framework wherein this individual can be studied. 
Keywords: human being, person, logically primitive.
    UNA COMPRENSIÓN ORDINARIA DE                
SERES HUMANOS
Resumen: En este artículo clarifico el término 'ser humano' a través de 
la especificación de conceptos asociados con la intención de enfatizar 
la primacia de un concepto en particular. Este es el concepto de Witt-
genstein de ser humano ordinaro como es usado en las Investigaciones 
Filosoficas (2009). Argumento que esa noción es lógicamente primitiva, 
esto es, un elemento básico en nuestro repertorio conceptual que nos 
puede servir como una fuente preliminar para analizar diversos aspec-
tos de este individuo. La idea is presentar aqui un marco conceptual 
dentro del cual este individuo puede ser estudiado.
Palabras clave: ser humano, persona, lógicamente primitivo.
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1. Introduction
What does it mean to say that an individual is human? It 
is generally thought that we place others in the ‘human being’ 
category insofar as we ascribe them a wide range of  properties 
such as corporeal states like size, weight, and a physical location 
– and, more importantly, psychological states such as intentions, 
beliefs, desires, and feelings. Usually we do not have any trouble 
recognizing that others possess mental states or classifying other 
people as human. However, once we begin to view this matter 
from a philosophical perspective, we can question the nature of  
our knowledge of  others as human beings. For how is it that 
we know for a fact that the individuals we see on the streets, 
with whom we interact on a daily basis, are actually people? Ul-
timately, the only mental states that are transparent are my own, 
whereas those of  others lie beyond my realm of  experience. If  
I am aware at all of  the existence of  these states, it is because I 
perceive my own ─but I can only perceive the behavior of  others 
and not the concrete beliefs, desires, and feelings motivating it, 
so the problem of  whether it is an expression of  mental states 
appears to be unsolvable. Thereby, if  the only way I can decide 
whether others are human beings is by verifying that they have 
psychological states, it seems that I can never determine if  I am 
surrounded by humans.
It could be argued in response that our ability to judge others 
as human beings rests solely on the capacity of  recognizing that 
they must be attributed the sort of  properties mentioned above. 
Still, this answer does not prove satisfactory as it presupposes that 
viewing others as human necessarily means recognizing them as 
worthy of  the application of  a large set of  human-like proper-
ties. On the other hand, it could be said that we recognize the 
existence of  psychological states in others based on the analogy 
with our own case, as this analogy provides us with sufficient 
knowledge about humanity in individuals. Yet, for one thing, the 
way in which my verbal behavior relates to my own mental states 
could hardly constitute an adequate basis for inferring that the 
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behavior of  others correlate, in sufficiently similar ways, to their 
own mental states. The evidence I have so far gathered about my 
own case is notably limited, so it could not serve in accounting 
for an indefinite number of  cases; it would merely allow hasty 
generalizations about what occurs in a far greater number of  
cases where others are involved.  Furthermore, the way I ve-
rify psychological self-ascriptions significantly differs from the 
method through which mental properties are usually attributed 
to others. In contrast to other-ascription of  mental predicates, I 
do not rely on the observation of  my own behavior in order to 
self-ascribe these predicates (see Strawson 394). Given, then, that 
I cannot know solely on the basis of  the analogy with my own 
case whether others have mental states like my own and which 
these might turn out to be, it appears that I cannot know, either, 
whether others are human, that is, if  I can only know about the 
humanity of  others after I have determined that they undergo 
such states.
 Even so, it is not clear that we judge others as human beings 
only after we have reached the conclusion that they (must) have 
psychological states. An alternative approach to be explored in 
this article is that we naturally or instinctively treat others as hu-
man beings and attend to the psychological states they experien-
ce without previously questioning whether or not they possess 
such states. For if  we are ever to know that others are people, it 
would rather be due to the characteristic reactions and responses 
they elicit from us. 
Now, given the multiplicity of  meanings of  ‘human being’ 
such as the genetic and moral acceptations of  the term, we 
should distinguish in the course of  this inquiry which notion we 
have in mind to demarcate the traits of  the being we are referring 
to. This way, we will be able to clarify what we mean when saying 
that a certain individual is human. I shall thus analyze several 
notions typically associated to the term ‘human’. This analysis 
will primarily revolve around Wittgenstein’s notion of  a human 
being (1953). Other conceptions will be examined as well, parti-
cularly, Paul Snowdon’s genetic notion (2014). Additionally, I will 
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advance and defend the claim that Wittgenstein’s notion can be 
interpreted as logically primitive. To substantiate this claim, I will 
argue that there exists a parity of  cases with Strawson’s approach 
to the concept of  person.
 
2. Human Beings
In the context of  addressing a large set of  philosophical as-
sumptions, Wittgenstein appeals in his Philosophical Investigations to 
a common sense of  ‘human being’ that applies to an individual 
who “has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious 
or unconscious” (§ 281). He regards this individual as someone 
towards whom we possess a natural or instinctual attitude that 
consists of  an extensive range of  characteristic reactions, res-
ponses and dispositions. This is a creature that we automatically 
treat as someone in possession of  mental states, which partly 
constitute what he is. This attitude goes hand in hand with the 
treatment of  this creature as a human being, which crucially differs 
from a belief  or opinion we form in order to include him in 
the human being category. As Wittgenstein states, “[m]y attitude 
towards him [i.e., a human being] is an attitude towards a soul. 
I am not of  the opinion that he has a soul” (II, IV, § 22). The 
notion that human beings have mental states, then, is not just a 
conclusion we reach based on the observation of  their verbal 
behavior. On the contrary, we have a practical concern towards 
these beings that results from several interactions with them, a 
concern particularly shown in reactions that contrast those we 
have towards other objects of  our attention.
David Cockburn accounts for this ‘practical orientation’ as 
instinctually given “in part in the fact that certain emotions and 
actions would come naturally to me in response to certain beha-
vior” on the part of  a human being (6). Furthermore, he stres-
ses how important this practical orientation is to Wittgenstein’s 
approach by arguing that he places it in the center of  his picture 
of  the human being. What this picture offers is an ordinary con-
text wherein numerous engagements with people already include 
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a characteristic treatment that reveals the fact that we already 
conceive them as having mental states. Wittgenstein’s framework 
circumscribes an ordinary understanding of  the human being 
meant to oppose a rationalist portrayal, where one would be in 
the position to treat others as humans only if  one knew for a 
fact that they have experiences. In principle, this ordinary un-
derstanding would assist us in resisting the rationalistic view that 
leads us to be puzzled about whether others are actually human. 
Thus, from the ordinary standpoint, we feel compelled to react to 
someone’s manifestation of  pain, e.g., treating him in consequen-
ce as a human being, whether we take pity on him, respond iras-
cibly, or else feel apathy. Indifference would not amount to the 
absence of  a reaction but, rather, to one reaction more amongst 
others. The main discrepancy with the rationalist picture resides 
then in the natural fact that we do not usually infer the existence 
of  a psychological state of  pain residing somehow ‘under the 
surface’ of  the human being grimacing in front of  us. The target 
of  our reactions is not a putative homunculus expressing his pain 
through the human being’s features. Rather, the target is only the 
flesh-and-bone human being we are confronted with.
Moreover, conceiving myself  as a human being involves in 
the same sense having a certain attitude towards myself, which is 
to say, a practically driven concern about me (20). This attitude, 
again, is instinctual in that it is not the end result of  a thought 
process through which I confirm that I am actually human given 
that I happen to find ‘in myself ’ psychological states like those 
of  other humans. That I am a proper object of  the sort of  re-
actions and responses Wittgenstein has in mind is shown in the 
several ways I treat myself, while these in turn incite reactions 
and responses from other human beings. Ultimately, the attitudes 
I possess towards myself  come about instinctually.
Resisting Behaviorism
Although Wittgenstein opposes the rationalist picture of  
human beings, this does not imply that he advocates for a class 
of  physicalism such as behaviorism (Philosophical Investigations § 
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307). According to him, the object of  our natural reactions and 
responses is not just a human body, for what sort of  distinction 
are we making when we say that it is the body that feels pain and 
not the man? In effect, he asks, “How does it become clear that 
it is not the body [that feels pain]?” (§ 286) After all, there is some 
absurdity in saying that it is merely a body or a part of  it that feels 
pain: “if  someone has a pain in his hand, then the hand does not 
say so (unless it writes it)” (§ 286.). In the end, when it comes to 
tracking our own reactions and responses to someone’s pain, it 
is the whole human being and not only his body who we sym-
pathize with: “one does not comfort the hand, but the sufferer: 
one looks into his eyes” (§ 286.). It is true that human behavior 
is a constitutive aspect of  Wittgenstein’s picture, but to limit the 
picture to this aspect would exclude several dimensions of  the 
human being that are purposely meant to be encompassed in his 
depiction.  
In this regard, John Cook advises against reading Wittgens-
tein as embracing behaviorism. When one interprets human 
beings in terms of  their types of  actions, one’s ordinary judg-
ments are not grounded in “protocol statements,” which are pro-
positions merely about humans conduct amounting to “colorless 
bodily movements” (118). Such an analysis would depart from 
our ordinary interpretation of  the actions of  humans, for it is not 
based upon such statements. Indeed, Cook maintains that the 
assumption whereby “we are forced to recognize descriptions (or 
observations) of  bodily movements as being epistemologically 
basic in our knowledge of  other persons” is unwarranted (118). 
Our ordinary perception of  human beings does not rest on their 
description of  them as bodies in movement. On the contrary, 
it is only after we have ordinarily judged the actions of  humans 
that we can move on to a more abstract level of  comprehension, 
thus perceiving them solely as physical objects moving through 
space. But this level would be derived from the ordinary percep-
tion of  them and, ultimately, would depend on it.
The Holism of  Living Human Beings
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It is worth noting that Wittgenstein restricts the logical type 
of  an individual deserving psychological attributions to a living 
human being and what resembles or behaves like it (Philosophical 
Investigations § 281). As discussed previously, recognizing others 
as human beings involves possessing a wide range of  reactions 
with which to reciprocate them, insofar as they initially act in 
ways that provoke such reactions. Now, all of  this is possible 
because of  our responses to these individuals as particular forms 
of  life. “Only surrounded by certain normal manifestations of  
life,” Wittgenstein writes in Zettel, “is there such a thing as an ex-
pression of  pain. Only surrounded by an even more far-reaching 
particular manifestation of  life, such a thing as the expression 
of  sorrow or affection” (§ 534). This suggests, broadly speaking, 
that the presence of  human life is a precondition for our ascrip-
tions of  mental states. In the absence of  human life, the afo-
rementioned reactions and responses to humans could not be 
provoked and, consequently, people’s psychological states would 
not be a matter of  our concern. Actually, we do not include dead 
human beings in the category of  individuals towards whom we 
react in the ways described by Wittgenstein because we do not 
regard them as having experience: “a corpse seems to us quite 
inaccessible to pain. — Our attitude to what is alive and to what 
is dead is not the same. All our reactions are different” (Philosophi-
cal Investigations § 284). As Wittgenstein observes, this difference 
does not yet imply that we do not respond to human corpses in 
a specific manner, which is evidently different from, say, our res-
ponses to dead animals and inanimate objects. To be precise, the 
typical responses we exhibit towards human forms of  life com-
pose a distinguished set, the specificity of  which delimits the at-
titudes we would consider to be oriented towards living humans 
and what resemble them. For example, we do not fear inanimate 
objects in the same sense that we fear the aggression of  human 
beings. As Cockburn suggests, “[f]or most of  us another’s inten-
se anger can be disturbing in a way which is quite different from 
that in which a landslide is generally thought of  disturbing” (4). 
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Then again, we are not usually disturbed only because we 
have determined that someone must hate us on the basis of  ob-
serving his demeanor, as if  such hatred would potentially bring 
about harm to us by using his body in a specific way so as to 
inflict pain on us. Quite the opposite: we feel one way or another 
about a human being as a whole. Consider Merleau-Ponty’s illus-
tration:
Imagine that I am in the presence of  someone who, for one re-
ason or another, is extremely annoyed with me. My interlocutor 
gets angry and I notice that he is expressing his anger by speaking 
aggressively, by gesticulating and shouting. But where is this anger? 
People will say that it is in the mind of  my interlocutor. What this 
means is not entirely clear. For I could not imagine the malice and 
cruelty which I discern in my opponent’s looks separated from 
his gestures, speech and body. None of  this takes place in some 
otherworldly realm, in some shrine located beyond the body of  
the angry man. It really is here, in this room and in this part of  the 
room, that the anger breaks forth. It is in the space between him 
and me that it unfolds … anger inhabits him and it blossoms on 
the surface of  his pale or purple cheeks, his blood-shot eyes and 
wheezing voice. (85)
It is thus that Merleau-Ponty rejects the notion that psycho-
logical states inhabit something other than an entire human 
being. “Other human beings,” he argues, “are never pure spirit 
for me: I only know them through their glances, their gestures, 
their speech – in other words, through their bodies” (82). By the 
same token, he continues, “another human being is certainly more 
than simply a body to me: rather, this other is a body animated 
by all manner of  intentions, the origin of  numerous actions and 
words” (82). Similarly, we can interpret Wittgenstein as thinking 
of  the human being in a holistic way: namely, as a creature who 
we ordinarily perceive as undivided, capable of  receiving psycho-
logical and corporeal ascriptions since he is uniformly the natural 
bearer of  both. 
The point, then, seems not to be so much that we are human 
because we have human bodies and human psychology. Instinc-
tively, we respond to these creatures as having mental states and 
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processes with the same degree of  confidence that we ascribe 
corporeal traits to them. To the same degree that we may tri-
vially consider others as being of  a certain weight and height 
– although we do not know exactly what those might turn out 
to be - we can rightly expect others to have intentions, beliefs, 
desires and dispositions. Therefore, whichever is the way we end 
up perceiving someone as a human being, we nonetheless treat 
him as one regardless.
Countering Skepticism of  Other Minds
A notable implication of  Wittgenstein’s approach is that it 
presents a way out of  the Cartesian problem of  other minds. 
His line of  argumentation serves as a precedent for contesting 
radical skepticism about the humanity of  others. Insofar as our 
treatment of  others is in accordance with our natural reactions 
and dispositions towards humans, such treatment demands no 
justification. The burden of  the proof  rather lies on the skeptic, 
who must provide sufficient evidence for questioning humanity 
in others by doubting the validity of  our natural reactions and 
dispositions towards them. In fact, at times one may have reaso-
nable doubt about the authenticity of  the expressions of  sorrow 
or pain of  other humans; but in what contexts would one deny 
the humanity of  individuals even though one manifests natural 
reactions toward them? Without the possibility of  error, as Witt-
genstein would say, we cannot possibly be right, so the skeptic 
would have to find plausible reasons to undermine the authen-
ticity of  our reactions. In this regard, Cook asks the following:
If  the question is whether they are people or not, we must ask: 
‘People as opposed to what?’ And here the answer is not at all clear. 
If  I look at my son playing near by and ask, ‘What else might he 
be?’, no answer suggests itself. He is clearly not a statue, nor is he 
an animated doll of  the sort we sometimes see looking very lifelike. 
He is my own child, my own flesh and blood. (121)
Cook thus interprets Wittgenstein as claiming that, when 
pushed to the extreme, the skeptic’s doubt becomes unsatisfac-
tory. As a consequence of  adopting the philosophical ideas of  
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‘body’ and ‘bodily movement’, he thinks that we create a meta-
physical fissure between an ordinary human being and his body 
that cannot exist (128). However, once we take an ordinary hu-
man being to be central to our reactions, this fissure cannot exist. 
Thereby, in the absence of  such a gap, the skeptic will have to 
find other ways to question the humanity of  others. The burden 
of  the proof  lies with the skeptic, who must provide reasons for 
doubting our normal understanding of  humans. In other words, 
the burden lies on those who want to deny humanity in the in-
dividuals towards whom the skeptics have already displayed na-
tural reactions as if  they were human beings. These reactions and 
responses are ‘basic’ in the sense that we do not need reasons for 
having them. 
A skeptic, though, could try to shift the burden of  the proof  
back and demand evidence from Wittgenstein which would 
substantiate his ordinary characterization of  human beings.  Still, 
at this stage Wittgenstein would claim that we have reached the 
rock bottom of  our beliefs (Philosophical Investigations § 248). That 
we feel inclined to treat others as human beings is already part 
of  what is involved in belonging to a human form of  life. The 
only valid way to err in ascribing humanity to these forms of  life 
would require seeing those individuals from outside a historical, 
social, and physical context. But, as we are already situated in a 
given context and we are in constant contact with other humans 
(Taylor 76), we cannot make sense of  such radical doubt. The 
starting point of  our inquiries is precisely a ‘rough ground’ (Cf. 
Philosophical Investigations § 107) where we ascribe mental proper-
ties to people. This ground does not have or need a foundation, 
inasmuch as one does not ordinarily need proof  of  the humanity 
of  others to treat them as such.
In this respect, Wittgenstein observes a type of  immedia-
teness in the way that we become aware of  the fact that others 
undergo mental states, particularly, as we naturally feel compelled 
to respond to the feelings, beliefs, and desires of  others. Such 
immediacy takes place in the context of  a ‘rough ground’ (§ 107) 
where everyday human beings interact with each other in several 
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ways. Notice, though, that Wittgenstein is not simply pointing 
out that there is a connection between having instinctive attitudes 
towards others and recognizing them as human beings. Instead, 
he provides a picture of  this connection where the rationalist 
assumption that there is something more basic or fundamental 
than these attitudes – such as recognizing others as humans – is 
excluded.  “The attitude,” Cockburn explains, “is what is basic in 
our relations with each other; it does not have, or need, any un-
derpinning in the form of  a ‘belief ’ about the character of  what 
we are confronted with” (23). The reason is that we immediately 
and spontaneously come up with such a belief: “To ‘recognize 
these as people’, we might say, just is to have the attitude” (Ibid.). 
This explains why Wittgenstein does not see the need to justify 
our reactions and responses to individuals, since forming a be-
lief  about the character of  others is one more attitude amongst 
others. Therefore, insofar as ascribing mental states to others 
occurs instinctively – i.e., as effortlessly as treating others like 
human beings –, forming an opinion about their psychological 
states is not in and of  itself  a ‘basic’ process on which our reac-
tions and responses to others could be grounded. 
Let us now turn to Strawson’s conception of  a person in or-
der to establish the basis for arguing later on that Wittgenstein’s 
human being concept can be shown to connote similar attributes.
3. Persons
In Individuals (1959), Strawson refers to a concept of  a per-
son that denotes a logical type of  entity that can be ascribed 
different types of  predicates, regardless of  their class. This is, 
“the concept of  a type of  entity such that both predicates ascri-
bing states of  consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal 
characteristics, a physical situation, etc. are applicable to a single 
individual of  that single type” (388). These predicates apply to 
such an individual in virtue of  the fact that person is a logically pri-
mitive notion, meaning that it has a central place in our concep-
tual scheme and in our linguistic practices. The fact that it is an 
elementary tool in our linguistic repertoire explains how it shapes 
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our attributions of  states of  consciousness. The concept of  a 
person, he stresses, is logically prior to that of  an individual cons-
ciousness or body (389), so that ascriptions of  psychological and 
bodily properties are logically secondary, derived from the notion 
of  a person (389). By implication, a person cannot be analyzed 
in terms of  those psychological or corporeal concepts, i.e., either 
as “an animated body or … an embodied anima.” (389). On the 
contrary, “states of  consciousness could not be ascribed at all, 
unless they were ascribed to persons” (389) in that the existence 
of  persons is a requisite for mental ascriptions. In other words, 
the primitive character of  this notion is  “a necessary condition 
of  states of  consciousness being ascribed at all,” because they 
are ascribed “to the very same things as certain corporeal characte-
ristic, a certain physical situation, etc.” (389).
It follows that the idea of  a ‘pure individual consciousness’ 
understood as a logical ingredient of  persons could not exist, or, 
at least, he thinks that it could not exist as a primitive concept 
by appeal to which the concept of  person could be explained. 
Rather, if  such a notion exists at all, it must be “a secondary, non-
primitive concept, which is itself  explained, analyzed, in terms 
of  the concept of  person.” (389). A person is thus conceived as 
a “two-sided thing,” and not as the combination of  “two one-
sided things” (389) — i.e., as a mind or pure consciousness, on 
the one hand, and a discrete body, on the other. Therefore, affir-
ming that an individual is a person would not involve conceiving 
it as an entity made out of  a mind and a body (see Descartes 
1997 48). From one perspective, a person is said to have a body, 
not to be one (Hacker “Strawson’s Concept of  a Person” 39). 
From another, mental states like beliefs and desires apply not 
merely to a body but to a person undergoing those states. Ac-
cording to Strawson, then, ‘I’ does not refer to an ‘inner’ subject 
of  experience or else to someone’s body. Instead, it refers to the 
person employing the pronoun, which is the genuine bearer of  
both psychological and material ascriptions. The genuine bearer 
of  mental predicates – a person – is naturally suitable for ‘I’ “be-
cause I am a person among others. And the [mental] predicates 
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which would, per impossibile, belong to the pure subject [of  expe-
rience] if  it could be referred to, belong properly to the person 
to which “I” does refer” (390).
On the First Person/Third Person Asymmetry
When it comes to ascribing mental states, though, Strawson 
notices an asymmetry between first- and third-person methods 
of  correction. It can be verified by contrasting how a subclass of  
psychological predicates is applied to oneself  and how it applies 
to others. According to him, one attributes these predicates to 
oneself  without the help of  any behavioral criterion, but judges 
the correctness of  their ascription to others solely on the basis 
of  their behavior (394). Other-ascription of  this set of  predi-
cates entails an intention or a state of  consciousness which is 
shown in an action, that is, a pattern of  bodily movements (398): 
“I mean such things as ‘going for a walk,’ ‘furling a rope,’ ‘playing 
ball,’ ‘writing a letter’” (398). For instance, ‘going for a walk’ is 
a psychological predicate that we can ascribe to others based on 
the observation of  their actions. The asymmetry, though, resides 
in the natural fact that I can self-ascribe this property without ex-
ternal basis of  observation. To be sure, I can predict my actions 
without interpreting my own behavior. Strawson claims that that 
the basis for self-ascriptions of  mental properties is “entirely 
adequate,” and yet, “this basis is quite distinct from those on 
which one ascribes the predicate to another” (394), as this subset 
is other-ascribable only on the basis of  behavioral criterion. 
At the same time, Strawson considers that first- and third-
person methods of  correction of  mental ascriptions are inter-
dependent. Such interdependence lies in the fact that we can 
interpret others as suitable objects of  mental predicates only if  
we are disposed to self-ascribe them. The reverse is also true: 
namely, we can predicate these psychological properties to our-
selves without any observational criterion because we are dispo-
sed to ascribe them to others. Moreover, in order to interpret the 
bodily movements of  others as actions, one conceives oneself  in 
function of  the concept of  a person: “It is easier to understand 
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how we can see each other, and ourselves, as persons, if  we think 
first of  the fact that we act, and act on, each other, and act in 
accord with a common human nature” (399). As Hacker points 
out, the methods through which self-ascribable and other-ascri-
bable psychological predicates are applied are not processes with 
absolutely nothing in common. They rather represent “two sides 
of  a single coin” (“Strawson’s Concept of  a Person” 27). Indeed, 
he finds that “we interpret … the movements of  the bodies of  
others only by seeing them as elements of  plans of  action akin to 
our own, of  which we know the present course and future deve-
lopments without observation of  the present movements of  our 
own body” (27). Strawson’s idea, then, is that we ascribe intentions 
to the persons whose bodily movements we can observe because 
of  a displayed pattern of  action only to the extent that we are also 
disposed to ascribe such actions to ourselves. If  one is to make 
sense of  one’s own intentions, one must have a sense of  what it 
means to be a person with intentions or dispositions to actions, 
which can be developed only by conceiving others as relating to 
one another on the basis of  what they intend to do. Therefore, 
the asymmetry existing between first- and third-person methods 
of  verification does not make any one of  these methods more 
indispensable over the other, for they complement each another 
in the process of  learning how to apply psychological predicates 
pertaining to the subclass mentioned above. 
Now that we have examined Wittgenstein’s notion of  a hu-
man being and Strawson’s concept of  a person, let us see in what 
ways there is a parity of  cases between these approaches.
4. On the Logical Status of  the Human Being Concept
“Human being” is an ambiguous expression that connotes 
at least four notions. First, there is the genetic sense of  the term 
referring to a member of  the Homo sapiens species (Cf. Snowdon 
2014). Secondly, there is the moral sense that applies to a mem-
ber of  the moral community (Cf. Warren 1973). Furthermore, 
Aristotle defines a human being essentially as a rational animal, 
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offering thus a third notion that focuses on the cognitive capa-
cities of  this creature. Lastly, there is the ordinary notion instan-
tiated in Wittgenstein’s usage of  the expression. I will now ela-
borate on the status of  Wittgenstein’s notion of  a human being 
by considering whether it can be interpreted as primitive in our 
conceptual scheme. Then, I will describe the ways it relates to the 
genetic notion to further explain the central place it has in our 
conceptual scheme.
The Human Being in a Primitive Conception
As previously discussed, Strawson speaks of  the primitive-
ness of  ‘person’ in relation to the secondary status of  notions 
like ‘consciousness’, ‘mind’, and ‘body’. He argues that the no-
tion of  a person cannot be analyzed as that of  an individual 
consciousness or body (389), while maintaining that ascriptions 
of  states of  consciousness, together with corporeal ascriptions, 
can be explained relative to a holistic understanding of  a person. 
Even more, he conceives of  the presence of  a person as a neces-
sary condition for the ascription of  mental and physical states. 
Similarly, we can characterize Wittgenstein’s concept of  a 
human being as primitive if  it cannot be explained or analyzed 
either into the genetic, moral, or Aristotelian conception of  a hu-
man being. Inasmuch as Strawson considers the concept of  body 
to be derived from ‘person’, the ordinary concept of  a human 
being is primitive or basic in relation to the (secondary) status 
of  the genetic notion of  a human being. If  this is the case, the 
genetic, moral, and Aristotelian notions of  a human being are 
not logical ingredients of  the ordinary concept. Conversely, the 
ordinary notion must be a logical ingredient of  the genetic, mo-
ral, and Aristotelian conceptions.
Moreover, Wittgenstein considers the human being holisti-
cally, which can be interpreted – like Strawson’s conception of  a 
person – as a unified object of  our concern. To the same extent, 
then, it can be inferred that the common concept we possess 
of  individuals must be present in our conceptual repertoire in 
a primitive form. For, in the end, through this concept we ulti-
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mately attend to the common man. Practically speaking, from 
Wittgenstein’s perspective we react to the ordinary human being 
and not just to some of  its attributes, that is, regardless of  what 
is our attitude towards the individual in its entirety. For instance, 
we are instinctively prone to attend to the person’s suffering; his 
pain is part of  our concern, but only insofar as it is a concern for 
his individual wellbeing. The ordinary human being, then, is not 
something we find in the world already categorized either accor-
ding to a biological, moral, or psychological set of  properties. On 
the contrary, it is after we grasp the common notion that we are 
able to develop other notions of  a human being, depending on 
the interests and necessities of  our endeavor. 
Thus, since the ordinary concept occupies a central position 
in our conceptual network, it serves as a starting point on which 
the questions driving our inquiries about human beings are ba-
sed. It would thus be possible to explain our ascriptions of  bio-
logical, moral, and cognitive properties relative to humans based 
on our primitive understanding and employment of  the human 
being notion, since these properties can all be traced to the com-
mon human. Either a biological, moral, or psychological exami-
nation has its own advantages and disadvantages. For although 
it serves to explain a series of  aspects of  the ordinary human, 
since it is interested in one sense of  ‘human being’ over the rest, 
either investigation cannot do justice to all of  the dimensions of  
the human being. Either way, as each secondary notion of  the 
human being emerges by emphasizing aspects or characteristics 
of  the ordinary individual, each can be said to derive from our 
ordinary understanding of  this being, which is not yet categori-
zed from either perspective.  
Now, another way in which Wittgenstein’s approach resem-
bles Strawson’s is that the presence of  an ordinary human being 
can be interpreted as a necessary condition for the ascriptions 
of  biological, moral, and cognitive characteristics. Let us exami-
ne as a case study how the genetic characterization of  a human 
being presupposes the existence of  the ordinary human being, to 
which we attribute biological properties that fix the latter within 
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the category of  a species. What we need to find out, then, is 
whether the set of  properties ascribable to the ordinary human 
can be exhausted in a complete and accurate biological descrip-
tion of  this creature. Specifically, we need to determine if  our 
applications of  the ordinary sense of  ‘human being’ can be sa-
tisfactorily explained in function of  a biological account of  this 
individual. With this intention, let us see how the genetic notion 
of  a human being is employed in an animalist approach.
A Vantage Perspective on the Ordinary Human Being
According to Paul Snowdon, what persists over the course 
of  a person’s life is the bodily continuity of  an animal. This view 
is supported on an identity thesis whereby “[e]ach of  us is iden-
tical with, is one and the same as, an animal” (7). The person one 
is would amount to no more or less than a human animal situa-
ted in a discernible space, so that ultimately “[t]he person is the 
animal (where the person is)” (4). From his perspective, then, the 
person does not differ in any relevant way from the Homo sapiens. 
He suggests that many traits we would assign to the ordinary 
person or human being are explained by evolutionary theory, so 
that psychology, for example, is irrelevant to animal persistence 
over time. Its cognitive and linguistic capacities have thus arisen 
in the course of  evolution, just as any other device from which 
this animal has benefited from (4). The development of  these 
capacities is explained in terms of  the ways this organism has 
thought about its environment. 
Yet, Snowdon seems to expand the notion of  ‘animal’ so as 
to capture diverse types of  properties we generally attribute to 
the ordinary human. In his appeal to natural selection, he privi-
leges the biological dimension of  the ordinary human being by 
selecting the genetic category as the most ‘basic’ perspective to 
be taken on the human being. This way, the genetic concept is 
appealed to in order to argue that bodily continuity is what re-
ally matters when it comes to deciding what persists during the 
course of  a human life. But it is not clear how this expansion of  
meaning would be justified. First, in its common sense, “human 
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being” is not meant to apply exclusively to the body of  a human 
being. We rather denote with it a single entity, an individual of  a 
primitive logical class. Actually, our instinct is to respond to the 
other as a human being with physical characteristics, and not par-
ticularly as a homo sapiens. Secondly, this use of  ‘animal’ would at 
least not be completely justified by evolutionary theory, since, for 
all we know, the cognitive and linguistic faculties of  this animal 
make it a special case in evolutionary biology. Indeed, we only 
attribute some traits to human beings – such as using language 
and having culture, which entails passing on knowledge to future 
generations. Thus, it is not clear how this broad conception of  
‘animal’ would be supported through the appeal to natural selec-
tion.
Then again, the theoretical advantages of  evolutionary 
theory are not in question. The expansion of  the meaning of  
‘animal’ could in turn be justified as offering one vantage pers-
pective on the human being based on the background of  evo-
lutionary biology. That is, a standpoint on the ordinary human 
being from which we can predict and explain much of  his be-
havior. Nonetheless, the point is rather that we do not ordinarily 
conceive of  the human being as a homo sapiens: our understanding 
of  a human being as pertaining to a species comes after the fact, 
when we classify what type of  animal we are from the vantage 
point offered by evolutionary theory. Our primitive comprehen-
sion of  the human being would thereby not presuppose or requi-
re the biological grounds afforded by evolutionary theory, as we 
can explain the actions and reactions of  common human beings 
without its help. The issue then with how Snowdon expands the 
genetic notion of  animal is that it sets stringent boundaries on 
the ordinary notion of  a human being, whilst actually the or-
dinary concept lacks such limitations. Our primitive understan-
ding of  a human being does not involve a distinction between 
a genetic, moral, or psychological category. From Wittgenstein’s 
perspective, the ordinary expression “human being” has no fixed 
or definite rules of  application (see Philosophical Investigations § 81), 
just as any other ordinary expression. In consequence, we cannot 
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strictly define what an ordinary human being is based on neces-
sary and sufficient conditions, given that this ordinary notion has 
no such sharp boundaries. Setting, then, those strict limitations 
would not actually solve the natural imprecision of  the ordinary 
sense of  “human being.”
A Sense in which the Ordinary Human is Favored
But is not the ordinary sense of  “human being” just another 
sense of  the expression, so that in the end it is not logically pri-
mitive? For why should the ordinary concept be privileged over 
the other notions of  a human being? At this stage, it is impor-
tant to notice that, if  the ordinary concept of  a human being 
were primitive, it would only acquire this status in virtue of  its 
relationship with other notions such as the genetic, moral, and 
Aristotelian. As the latter derive from it, the ordinary concept 
would be primitive in a relative way. There would not be, so to 
speak, a real sense of  “human being” to be favored, for it is clear 
that this expression is ordinarily ambiguous — favoring such real 
sense would thus be artificial. The common sense, though, is 
preferred for its practical advantages, to the extent that it plays a 
central role in our conceptual practices, particularly, in relation to 
the use of  notions derived from it. The ordinary notion is a pre-
condition in our understanding of  the different possible senses 
of  “human being,” so that without it we could not benefit from 
the theoretical advantages offered by adopting any particular no-
tion connoted by it. Thereby, we only favor the ordinary concept 
insofar as it is the logical beginning of  our biological, moral, and 
psychological inquiries. 
On a final note, it is not clear though that metaphysical ques-
tions about the nature of  human beings can be answered by fa-
voring any secondary sense of  “human being” over the rest. All 
one can do is point out the theoretical advantages and disadvan-
tages of  the biologist’s viewpoint, who might be interested in the 
genetic sense; the psychologist’s stance, who might be concerned 
with the cognitive-capacity sense; or, finally, the philosopher’s 
(or someone else’s) stance, who might be interested in the moral 
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sense. In our day-to-day life, however, we seem rather prone to 
viewing others as ordinary human beings in virtue of  our prac-
tical concerns. The ordinary sense is thus favored insofar as we 
naturally fall back on it when it comes to characterizing others as 
human beings.
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